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Changing the Rules of the Game: The Impact of Privatization on Firm Industrial Relations
INTRODUCTION
This paper examines the impact of privatization on the industrial  relations  environment  of  state-
owned enterprises (SOEs), focusing on the relative bargaining strength of management  and  trade
unions.  To date, much of the empirical research in this area is  based  on  individual  cases  in  the
UK (see for example Arrowsmith,  2003;  Ferner,  1998;  O’Connell  Davidson,  1993;  Pendleton,
1994, 1999).  In general, findings show that privatization places management in a relatively strong
bargaining position and can force trade unions to accept  concessions  such  as  reduced  employee
numbers.  However, such changes cannot be attributed solely to the transfer of ownership from the
public to the private sector.  Many of these changes were initiated while the  firm  was  still  under
state ownership, reflecting a change in government  policy  in  favour  of  commercializing  SOEs.
Market liberalization and increased competition have also been identified as  important  factors  in
determining the bargaining position of both management and unions following privatization.
In the context of Irish privatization, employment relations are also  likely  to  be  influenced  by
the introduction of substantial Employee Share-Ownership Plans (ESOP) as part of the transfer  to
private ownership.  In most cases the privatization  of  Irish  SOEs  has  included  a  14.9  per  cent
shareholding and representation on the firm’s board of directors for employees.  An important aim
of these schemes has been to gain  the  support  of  trade  unions  for  the  implementation  of  firm
restructuring  and  rationalization  programmes  (Sweeney,  2004).   It  can   be   argued   that   the
establishment  of  these  ESOPs  reflects  a  stakeholder   approach   to   privatization   in   Ireland.
Furthermore the existence of a substantial employee shareholding can be expected to improve  the
relative bargaining strength of trade unions, thereby at least partly offsetting the adverse impact of
privatization.
To date, the most significant privatization to  occur  in  Ireland  has  been  that  of  the  national
telecommunications operator Eircom.  Using data from a survey of employees this paper  explores
the  restructuring  and  privatization  of  Eircom  and  the  outcome   for   the   industrial   relations
environment of the firm.  In particular changes in the perceived bargaining strength of unions  and
management are examined.  As part of its privatization process  Eircom  established  an  ESOP  in
1998.  Employees received an initial 14.9 per cent  shareholding,  although  through  a  number  of
changes in firm ownership this  shareholding  has  grown  to  35  per  cent.   Given  its  substantial
shareholding and  influence,  our  analysis  will  examine  the  role  of  the  ESOP  in  shaping  the
industrial relations of the firm post-privatization.
BACKGROUND: EIRCOM’S INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS ENVIRONMENT
Since its establishment in 1984 Eircom (named Telecom Éireann prior to 1999) has been a  highly
unionized firm.  Of the employees surveyed almost 90 per cent were members of one of  Eircom’s
five recognized trade  unions.   Eircom’s  largest  union  is  the  Communications  Workers  Union
(CWU), which accounted for 73 per cent of surveyed employees.  Prior  to  privatization  relations
between management and  trade  unions  were  relatively  stable,  with  most  issues  being  settled
without need to refer to external dispute-resolution bodies  such  as  the  Labour  Court  or  Labour
Relations   Commission   (Hastings,   2003b).    However,   industrial   relations   were    relatively
bureaucratic and involved a great deal of procedural formality.  The  firm’s  only  major  industrial
dispute occurred in 1978 and was settled in favour of the firm’s trade unions.  This  resulted  in  ‘a
shift in the balance of power in favour of the unions  and  left  those  in  government  unwilling  to
countenance a similar strike occurring again’ (Hastings, 2003b, p.168).  This reflected the national
strategic importance of the telecommunications network and indicates the  high  level  of  political
sensitivity regarding industrial dispute within the industry.
In   the   mid-1990s   the   Irish   government   adopted   a   number   of   measures    aimed    at
commercializing  Eircom.   The  appointment  of  a  new  chief  executive  officer  and   personnel
director signalled an increase in managerial autonomy and a change in the direction of  managerial
strategy.  The firm was subsequently restructured around five market-based business units and  the
number of managerial layers was reduced (Telecom-Éireann,  1997a).   Significant  changes  were
made to place managers on a commercial footing, including the introduction of personal contracts,
the removal of management  from  collective  bargaining  and  the  increased  use  of  performance
related remuneration (Hastings, 2002).  In 1996 Eircom entered into a strategic alliance  when  the
government partly privatized the firm by selling  a  20  per  cent  shareholding  to  the  consortium
Comsource[1].
These  changes  in  both  government  policy  and   managerial   strategy   placed   pressure   on
management to take a harder line with the firm’s trade unions.  Furthermore, it reduced the  ability
of unions to use political pressure to maintain their bargaining position.  Management also  sought
to avoid industrial unrest through engaging with unions on  the  issue  of  reform.   Eircom’s  trade
unions saw privatization and firm restructuring as inevitable, and therefore recognized the need  to
engage with management in order to protecting the interests of their members  (Hastings,  2003b).
This compromise approach was facilitated by the government as part of  an  on-going  programme
of social partnership at the national level.
This collaborative approach  resulted  in  the  agreement  and  implementation  of  a  substantial
restructuring  plan  The  Telecom  Partnership  in  1997.    To   meet   the   challenges   of   market
deregulation  and  impending  privatization  the  telecom  partnership  entailed  supplementing  the
existing collective bargaining structures with partnership structures at the national,  business  unit,
and local levels.  The objectives of collective  bargaining  were  also  adjusted  to  reflect  the  new
commercial objectives of the firm.  As the personnel director of Eircom commented:
‘We are focused on the strategic bargaining model.  Our view is to move beyond  collective  bargaining,
which is reductionist in its very nature for one party or the other.  Strategic bargaining is about trying  to
create a bigger business cake and a strong position within which forms of distributive  bargaining  could
work.’
(Hastings, 2002, p.11)
The  telecom  partnership  also  involved   significant   changes   in   work   practices   and   the
introduction of cost-cutting measures, including reduced employee numbers,  increased  employee
pension  contributions  and  the  disbandment  of  existing  employee  benefit  schemes  (Telecom-
Éireann,  1997b).   In  exchange  employees  received  a  shareholding  in  the   firm   through   the
establishment of  the  Eircom  ESOP.   The  Eircom  ESOP  Trust  was  established  in  1998  with
employees  receiving  a  14.9  per  cent  share  of  the  company  and  the   right   to   appoint   two
representatives to Eircom’s board of directors.
In 1999 the Irish government sold its remaining shareholding in  Eircom  by  way  of  an  initial
public offer.  Since the completion of its privatization Eircom has undergone a number of changes
in  ownership,  including  takeovers  in  2001  and  2006,  and  is   currently   undergoing   another
takeover.  These changes in firm ownership have been accompanied  by  changes  in  management
and the introduction of further measures aimed at  reducing  the  firm’s  cost-base.   Recent  events
however appear to have had an adverse impact on the  level  of  management-union  collaboration.
For example, in 2007 management sought trade union agreement for a  set  of  proposed  measures
aimed at reducing operating costs.  After failing to reach agreement management  withheld  a  two
per cent pay rise provided for under national social partnership.  The firm’s unions responded with
the  threat  of  industrial  action  and  the   dispute   was   only   resolved   following   the   external
intervention of the Labour Relations Commission.  Incidents such as this highlight  the  significant
weaknesses that have arisen in the firm’s partnership structures and the  resulting  deterioration  in
the relations between firm management and trade unions (Sheehan, 2007).
Given its significant shareholding the ESOP has had a strong  influence  over  changes  in  firm
ownership since privatization.  It has used this position to increase its shareholding to 35  per  cent
and board-level representation to three directors.  It  may  be  expected  that  the  establishment  of
such a substantial employee shareholding would have a significant impact on the firm’s  industrial
relations.  However there appears to be little appetite among either management or trade unions to
allow  share-ownership  to  influence  existing  collective  bargaining  and  partnership   structures
(Hastings,  2002).   In  any  case  the  three  directors  appointed  from  the  ESOP  have  the  same
obligations as other company directors to promote the financial wellbeing of all shareholders,  and
thus cannot use their position to promote a trade union agenda.  Nor  have  the  trade  unions  used
the significant shareholding held in the ESOP Trust to bolster their own bargaining position.  As a
leading trade  unionist  and  director  of  the  Eircom  ESOP  Trust  stated  ‘the  management  of  the
company cannot ever be seen as creatures of the employees as shareholders.  ESOP Directors  in  the  Trust
cannot use it as a lever for trade union ends’ (Hastings, 2003a, p.7).
Overall, the Eircom ESOP was not ostensibly established with the aim of  promoting  industrial
democracy or the bargaining position of employees  (McCarthy  et  al.,  2010).  In  practice  it  has
provided  employees  with  a   form   of   compensation   in   return   for   firm   restructuring   and
rationalisation  and  the  firm’s  trade  unions  with  some  influence  in  decisions  regarding   firm
ownership.
MODEL AND HYPOTHESES
State  owned  enterprises  (SOEs)  are  often  large  employers  who  provide  services  that  are  of
national strategic importance (e.g. telecommunications, energy, public transport).   The  objectives
pursued by SOEs are not only based  on  commercial  criteria  but  also  take  account  of  political
pressures and social concerns.  Consequently industrial relations  matters  and  industrial  disputes
often loom large in government  policy  considerations  on  SOEs.   Government  can  influence  a
firm’s industrial relations by controlling the appointment of  managers  and  directors,  influencing
the policies and objectives that management pursue, and shaping the industrial relations structures
of the firm (Ferner and Colling,  1991;  1993).   According  to  Ferner  (1998)  negotiations  in  the
public sector are a triangulation between management,  trade  unions  and  the  government.   Both
unions and management can bypass engaging with one another  by  negotiating  directly  with  the
government.   This  can  convey  particular  advantages  on  trade  unions,  which  as  an  effective
mobilising force in the political arena can have considerable influence  on  government  decisions.
Thus SOEs are often highly unionized and are characterized  by  the  relatively  strong  bargaining
position held by trade unions.
Alternatively the privatization of SOEs can be expected to  ‘depoliticalize’  management-union
relations and to increase  the  relative  bargaining  strength  of  management  (Earle  et  al.,  1996).
Following privatization management are often provided with greater  autonomy  by  private-sector
shareholders.  The withdrawal of political control and the focus of private shareholders  on  wealth
creation can also provide management with clearly defined  and  quantifiable  targets  (Ferner  and
Colling, 1991; Pendleton, 1999).  As  a  result  management  can  be  expected  to  oppose  certain
union demands, particularly if they feel such  demands  will  reduce  shareholder  value.   Reduced
political intervention can also reduce the ability of unions to oppose reform through their status  as
political interest groups.  Where privatization is accompanied by market  liberalization,  economic
regulation, or technological advancement the subsequent need to  improve  firm  performance  and
protect market share also provides management with additional leverage in negotiating with  trade
unions (Ferner and Colling, 1993).  This gives rise to the first research hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: Privatization will be associated with an increase in the relative bargaining strength
of management.
Employee  share-ownership  can   also   have   a   direct   impact   on   the   industrial   relations
environment of the firm.  By providing voting rights, greater access to  financial  information  and
representation on the firm’s board  of  directors,  employee  share-ownership  can  be  expected  to
maintain  or  enhance  the  bargaining  strength  of   trade   unions   (Poole   and   Jenkins,   1990).
Furthermore managers may also have greater difficulties in opposing the demands of trade  unions
in a firm with a substantial employee shareholding.  In this  way,  the  ESOP  can  be  expected  to
counteract the adverse impact of privatization on the relative bargaining strength of  unions.   This
gives rise to the second research hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: The ESOP will be associated with an increase in the relative bargaining strength of
trade unions.
Obviously  hypotheses  1  and  2  are  mutually  exclusive.  Privatization  and  employee  share-
ownership can be expected to  have  opposing  outcomes  for  the  relative  bargaining  strength  of
management and trade unions.  Where the impact of privatization dominates an overall increase in
the relative bargaining strength of management can be expected, supporting hypothesis 1.  On  the
other hand, where  the  impact  of  the  ESOP  dominates  an  increase  in  the  relative  bargaining
strength of trade unions can be expected, confirming hypothesis 2.
In Figure 1 we model the effects of privatization  and  an  ESOP  on  the  perceived  bargaining
strength of trade unions and management.  The way in which employees perceive  changes  in  the
relative bargaining strength of their unions and management is not only influenced by  changes  in
the  ownership  structure  of  the  firm  created  by  privatization  and  an  ESOP.   It  can  also   be
influenced  by  changes  in  employee  welfare  that  result  from  the   internal   adjustments   (e.g.
operating cost reductions and changes in  work-practices  and  governance  structures)  made  as  a
result of privatization and employee share-ownership.
Figure 1: Impact of privatization/ESOP on the perceived bargaining strength of unions/management
[pic]
For  many  employees  changes  in  their  welfare  reflect  the  relative  bargaining  strength   of
management and trade unions.  Where employees feel there has been deterioration in their welfare
(e.g. reduced job security or autonomy), it is associated with a relative decrease in  the  bargaining
strength of  unions  and  an  improvement  in  that  of  management.   Three  aspects  of  employee
welfare  on  which  privatization  and  employee  share-ownership  have  a  significant  impact  are
included  in  the  analysis:  conditions  of   employment;   management-union   collaboration;   and
employee participation in firm decision-making.  A perceived increase  in  employee  welfare  will
be  associated  with  a  relative  increase  in  the  perceived  bargaining  strength  of  trade   unions.
Alternatively a decrease in employee welfare will  be  associated  with  a  relative  increase  in  the
perceived bargaining strength of management.  This gives rise to the final research hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3: Perceived changes in the levels of employee welfare will be associated with either a
relative decrease or increase  in  the  perceived  bargaining  strength  of  management  and  trade
unions.
METHODOLOGY
Data collection is based on an online survey of Eircom employees.  The survey was  conducted  in
February  2007,  eight  years   after   privatization   was   completed.    The   survey   received   the
endorsement  of  Eircom’s  management  and  trade  union  coalition,  who  encouraged  employee
participation by way of email prior to the survey’s distribution.   Using a  representative  sampling
frame supplied by firm management, the  survey  was  distributed  among  a  thousand  employees
using an online survey provider.  The final number of usable responses was 711, a response rate of
71 per cent of the population surveyed.
Measures
Changes in the bargaining strength of  management  (MGTBar)  and  trade  unions  (TUBar)  were
measured using two items that asked employees to indicate the level of change in their  bargaining
strength since privatization and the introduction of the ESOP (Table 2).  Changes in conditions  of
employment (Cond) were measured using a list of ten work conditions and asking  employees  the
degree of change in each since privatization (Table 1a).  Changes  in  employee  participation  was
measured using a list of nine work related  issues  and  asking  employees  to  indicate  changes  in
their level  of  involvement  in  decision-making  regarding  each  since  privatization  (Table  1b).
These nine items were subsequently divided into four items relating to operational issues (OpPart)
and five items relating to departmental and strategic level decision-making (StratPart).  Change  in
the level of management-union collaboration  (Collab)  was  measured  by  asking  employees  for
their level of agreement with six statements (Table 1c).
The  analysis  also  includes  a  number  of  control  variables  relating  to  respondents’  gender
(Gender),  years  of  employment  with  Eircom  (Tenure),   union   membership   (Union),   ESOP
membership (ESOP), and  area  of  occupation  (Retail,  Other).   Descriptive  statistics,  reliability
measures, and a correlation matrix of the variables are shown in  Appendix  1.   The  reliability  of
each measure was assessed using Cronbach’s Alpha (?), and each measure  was  found  to  have  a
reliability value in excess of .7
Table 1: Description of independent variables
|a) Perceived changes in conditions of employmenta                                     |
|                                                    |Incr. |Unch. |Decr. |      |     |
|What impact has privatization had on each of the    |(1-3) |(4)   |(5-7) |      |     |
|following conditions of employment in Eircom?       |%     |%     |%     |Mean  |S.D. |
|Security of employment.                             |14.2  |30.0  |55.8  |4.86  |1.55 |
|Hours worked per week.                              |32.4  |46.8  |20.8  |3.77  |1.40 |
|Availability of overtime.                           |16.4  |19.3  |64.3  |5.20  |1.80 |
|Flexibility in hours worked.                        |28.4  |37.0  |34.7  |4.22  |1.63 |
|Basic pay.                                          |12.2  |27.4  |60.5  |5.19  |1.60 |
|Incentives/benefits received (excluding ESOP        |15.5  |21.0  |63.5  |5.18  |1.63 |
|benefits).                                          |78.6  |13.4  |8.0   |2.46  |1.45 |
|Workload.                                           |46.9  |24.6  |28.6  |3.73  |1.83 |
|Mobility between tasks.                             |39.8  |32.0  |28.2  |3.91  |1.65 |
|Level of teamwork.                                  |13.6  |26.2  |60.2  |5.12  |1.56 |
|Level of training.                                  |      |      |      |      |     |
|b) Perceived changes in employee participationb                                       |
|                                                    |More  |Unch. |Less  |      |     |
|What impact has privatization had on the amount of  |(1-3) |(4)   |(5-7) |      |     |
|say you have in decisions made with regard to the   |%     |%     |%     |Mean  |S.D. |
|following?                                          |      |      |      |      |     |
|           |Manner in which assigned tasks are     |20.0  |33.9  |46.1  |4.63  |1.60 |
|Operational|completed.                             |15.4  |34.5  |50.4  |4.76  |1.47 |
|           |Hours worked.                          |17.7  |23.0  |59.3  |5.00  |1.67 |
|           |Level of pay/benefits.                 |11.5  |29.7  |57.9  |5.04  |1.47 |
|           |Level of training.                     |      |      |      |      |     |
|           |Hiring/dismissal of personnel.         |8.4   |27.0  |64.6  |5.33  |1.51 |
|Strategic/ |Promotion/transfer of personnel.       |7.9   |26.4  |65.7  |5.38  |1.47 |
|departmenta|Firm                                   |18.9  |23.1  |58.0  |5.01  |1.83 |
|l          |closures/acquisitions/mergers/takeovers|17.7  |18.0  |64.3  |5.23  |1.94 |
|           |.                                      |17.7  |22.3  |60.0  |5.13  |1.81 |
|           |Position/salary of senior management.  |      |      |      |      |     |
|           |Firm budget/finances.                  |      |      |      |      |     |
|c) Perceived changes management-union collaborationc                                  |
|                                                    |Agree |Neith.|Disa. |      |     |
|To what degree do you agree or disagree with each of|(1-3) |      |(5-7) |      |     |
|the following statements?                           |%     |(4)   |%     |Mean  |S.D. |
|                                                    |      |%     |      |      |     |
|Since the ESOP unions have been more willing to     |      |      |      |      |     |
|cooperate with management in solving the problems   |87.6  |6.3   |6.0   |2.10  |1.32 |
|facing Eircom.                                      |      |      |      |      |     |
|                                                    |      |      |      |      |     |
|Since privatization unions have been less willing to|10.8  |9.7   |79.5  |4.64  |1.58 |
|cooperate with management in solving the problems   |      |      |      |      |     |
|facing Eircom.                                      |      |      |      |      |     |
|                                                    |73.4  |10.0  |16.7  |2.75  |1.74 |
|Since the ESOP management have seen cooperation with|      |      |      |      |     |
|trade unions as vital in creating change.           |      |      |      |      |     |
|                                                    |46.2  |20.2  |33.6  |3.76  |1.80 |
|Since privatization management have put greater     |      |      |      |      |     |
|emphasis on cooperation with trade unions.          |66.9  |16.6  |16.5  |3.02  |1.62 |
|                                                    |      |      |      |      |     |
|Since the ESOP union-management relations have      |16.0  |18.2  |65.8  |5.16  |1.67 |
|improved.                                           |      |      |      |      |     |
|                                                    |      |      |      |      |     |
|Since privatization union-management relations have |      |      |      |      |     |
|deteriorated.                                       |      |      |      |      |     |
aEmployees presented with scale 1 (increased significantly) to 7 (decreased significantly)
bEmployees presented with scale 1 (much more say) to 7 (much less say)
cEmployees presented with scale 1 (strongly agree) to 7 (strongly disagree)
RESULTS
When surveyed the majority of employees (80%) reported that Eircom’s  management  were  in  a
strong bargaining position compared to only seven per cent  who  believed  they  were  in  a  weak
bargaining position[2].  On the other hand the majority of employees (54 per cent)  felt  that  trade
unions were in a weak bargaining position,  while  23  per  cent  felt  unions  maintained  a  strong
bargaining position.
Table 2: Changes in bargaining strength of management and trade unions
|Items                                                      |Increase|Neith. |Decrease |
|                                                           |        |(4)    |(5-7)    |
|                                                           |(1-3)   |%      |%        |
|                                                           |%       |       |         |
|Changes in bargaining strength of management since         |76.6    |17.0   |6.4      |
|privatization                                              |        |       |         |
|                                                           |74.5    |17.7   |7.9      |
|Changes in bargaining strength of management since         |        |       |         |
|establishing  ESOP                                         |20.2    |19.7   |60.1     |
|                                                           |        |       |         |
|Changes in bargaining strength of trade unions since       |29.2    |21.0   |49.8     |
|privatization                                              |        |       |         |
|                                                           |        |       |         |
|Changes in bargaining strength of trade unions since       |        |       |         |
|establishing ESOP                                          |        |       |         |
Note: employees presented with scale 1 (significant increase) to 7 (significant decrease)
Turning  to  changes  in  the  bargaining  strength  of  the  parties  since  privatization   and   the
introduction of the  ESOP,  Table  2  shows  that  the  majority  of  employees  reported  a  marked
increase in the bargaining strength of management and a corresponding decrease in the bargaining
strength of trade unions.  A surprising aspect of these results is the similarity in employee  opinion
when addressing changes in the context of  privatization  and  the  ESOP.   Approximately  75  per
cent of employees reported an increase in the bargaining strength of management in the context of
both privatization and the introduction of the ESOP.  When employees were asked  about  changes
in union bargaining strength, the majority reported a decrease since  privatization  (60.1  per  cent)
and the introduction of the ESOP (49.8  per  cent).   However  the  reduction  in  union  bargaining
strength is not as marked in the context of the ESOP and may reflect the  perceived  ability  of  the
ESOP to provide some support for the bargaining position of unions post-privatization.
These findings provide support for hypotheses 1 that privatization  will  be  associated  with  an
improvement in the relative bargaining  strength  of  management.   However,  they  provide  little
support for hypothesis 2 that the ESOP will be  associated  with  an  improvement  in  the  relative
bargaining strength of unions.  To a large extent the ESOP Trust is constrained  from  engaging  in
the operational activities of Eircom by a legal obligation to maintain and improve the value  of  its
portfolio on behalf of participants.  Representatives appointed to the firm’s board  of  directors  by
the ESOP also have a legal obligation towards  the  shareholders  of  the  firm.   Consequently  the
ESOP Trust and its board-level representatives cannot use their position to  directly  pursue  union
objectives.  Furthermore the ESOP is distinct from the  firm’s  industrial  relations  structures  and
pay and conditions of employment continue to be determined through a combination of  collective
bargaining and partnership.
DETERMINANTS OF CHANGES IN BARGAINING STRENGTH
Many of the above changes in the perceived bargaining strength of management and  trade  unions
arise directly from changes in the ownership structure of the firm.  However changes in  employee
welfare that are associated with  privatisation  and  employee  share-ownership  are  also  likely  to
impact on how employees perceive  changes  in  the  relative  bargaining  strength  of  unions  and
management.
The  regression  analysis  shown  in  Table  3  explores   the   role   changes   in   conditions   of
employment,  management-union  collaboration,  and  employee  participation  in  firm   decision-
making have in determining employee assessments of the relative  bargaining  strength  of  unions
and   management.    As   the   measures   of   operational   participation   (OpPart)   and   strategic
participation (StratPart) are highly correlated (? =  .65),  separate  regressions  are  run  to  capture
their effects.  Standardized regression coefficients (S?) between the variables  and  the  relevant  t-
statistics are reported.
The  results  of  the  regression  analysis  support  those  obtained  from   descriptive   statistics.
Findings show that changes in conditions of employment (S? = .24  &  -.11)  and  participation  in
operational decision-making (S? =  .30  &  -.21)  have  statistically  significant  relationships  with
perceived changes  in  both  union  and  managerial  bargaining  strength.   Overall  a  majority  of
respondents reported  deterioration  in  conditions  of  employment  and  operational  participation
since privatization (see Table 1).  Employees are likely to  place  considerable  importance  on  the
ability of trade unions to protect their work  conditions  and  to  act  as  their  representatives  with
regards  to  workplace  decision-making.   Thus  it  is  unsurprising  to  find  that  deterioration   in
employee welfare in relation to conditions and workplace participation  is  an  important  factor  in
reducing the relative bargaining strength of trade unions, and improving that of management.
Table 3 Determinants of changes in the bargaining strength of management and trade unions
|                    |Bargaining strength of trade  |   |Bargaining strength of        |
|                    |unions                        |   |management                    |
|Gender              |.143 (3.235)**                  |-.039 (-0.829)                  |
|Tenure              |.075 (1.269)                    |.006 (0.094)                    |
|Union               |.013 (0.240)                    |-.019 (-0.322)                  |
|Retail              |-.015 (-0.342)                  |.049 (1.030)                    |
|Other               |-.049 (-1.175)                  |.065 (1.479)                    |
|ESOP                |.029 (0.505)                    |.020 (0.323)                    |
|Cond                |.238 (5.349)***                 |-.106 (-2.239)*                 |
|Collab              |.001 (0.035)                    |.311 (7.163)***                 |
|OpPart              |.300 (6.812)***                 |-.207 (-4.415)***               |
|StratPartª          |-.084 (-2.032)                  |.116 (2.710)                    |
|R²                  |.256                            |.163                            |
|F                   |18.215(9,476)***                |10.307(9,476)***                |
Note: Dependent variables: changes in bargaining strength of management (MgtBar) and trade unions (TUBar).
*Significant at 0.05, **Significant at 0.01, ***Significant at 0.001
ªCoefficients for StratPart are derived from a separate regression analysis where StratPart is used in place of OpPart as an independent variable.
Unlike operational decision-making, employee involvement in  strategic  decision-making  was
found to have no statistically significant impact on either union or managerial bargaining strength.
 This may reflect the relatively low level of importance employees attach to  strategic-level  issues
in comparison to factors that have a more direct impact on workplace conditions.
A significant  proportion  of  employees  reported  improved  management-union  collaboration
since privatization (see Table 1).  The regression results indicate this has been a  significant  factor
in improving the perceived bargaining  strength  of  management  (S?  =  .31),  but  it  has  had  no
statistically significant impact on union bargaining strength.  This is surprising, given that it might
be expected that closer management-union relations would have lead  to  an  increase  the  relative
bargaining  strength  of  unions.   A  plausible  interpretation  is  a  belief  that  management-union
collaboration has undermined the traditional oppositional role of  trade  unions,  and  unions  have
been co-opted on to the management side.
  These findings provide some support for hypothesis 3.  As predicted a perceived deterioration
in  employee  welfare,  particularly  conditions  of  employment  and  operational  participation,  is
associated with reduced union bargaining strength and increased management bargaining strength.
CONCLUSIONS
Privatization can be expected to create significant changes in the industrial  relations  environment
of enterprises that move from public to private ownership.   In  the  case  of  Eircom,  privatization
was accompanied by the establishment of an ESOP that is unique in terms of its size and degree of
influence in the governance of  the  enterprise.   Consequently  it  provides  a  rich  opportunity  to
examine industrial relations issues from the perspective of employees participating in the ESOP.
The particular concern of  this  paper  is  how  these  changes  in  Eircom  affected  the  relative
bargaining strength of management and trade unions. It was predicted that privatization  would  be
associated with an increase in the relative bargaining strength of management and  that  the  ESOP
would be associated with an increase in the relative bargaining strength of trade unions.
Our results indicate  that  employees  believe  that  privatization  has  resulted  in  a  substantial
strengthening   of   the   bargaining   position   of   management   despite   employees’   substantial
shareholdings  within  the  firm.   Alternatively  a  perceived  decrease  in  the  relative  bargaining
strength of the trade unions is associated  with  deteriorations  in  conditions  of  employment  and
participation in workplace decision-making.  Furthermore, increased collaboration between unions
and management is associated with advantages to management rather than unions.
While  employee  perceptions   of   increased   managerial   bargaining   strength   is   relatively
unsurprising in the context of privatization, a perceived decrease in  union  bargaining  strength  is
striking given that employees have a 35 per cent shareholding and board-level representation.  The
observed changes in union bargaining strength may in part be  attributed  to  a  general  decline  in
Irish trade union density in  recent  years.   However,  this  is  unlikely  to  explain  the  substantial
decline in union influence  reported  by  Eircom  employees.   Overall  union  density  levels  have
declined considerably over the last 25 years from 61  per  cent  of  the  employed  labour  force  in
1985 to approximately 32 per cent in 2007 (D’Art and Turner, 2004; 2008).   However,  while  the
decline has been dramatic in the private sector, union density has remained high within the  public
sector and among current and former SOEs such as Eircom.  At the time of the  survey  almost  90
per cent of Eircom employees are members of one of the firm’s five recognised trade  unions.   To
account  for  the  observed  decline  in  union  bargaining   strength   we   suggest   three   possible
explanations.
First, the ESOP was  established  as  a  financial  scheme  with  benefits  granted  in  return  for
accepting  privatization  and  concessions  regarding   employment,   pension   contributions,   and
reduced  benefits.  The  ESOP  was  not  primarily  intended  as  a  vehicle  to  promote   industrial
democracy or encourage a culture of cooperation in decision-making.  
Second, legal aspects of the ESOP constrain it being used to directly enhance union  bargaining
strength.  While the ESOP appoints three directors to Eircom’s board, these directors have a  legal
obligation to make decisions that protect the  interests  of  all  shareholders  and  cannot  use  their
position to promote a union agenda.  Similarly, as a Trust, the directors of the Eircom ESOP  have
a legal obligation to protect the value of its portfolio on behalf of participants and cannot use  their
position to pursue other partisan objectives. In any case nearly 50 per  cent  of  ESOP  participants
are no longer employees of the firm since  the  terms  of  the  Trust  allow  participants  who  leave
Eircom to retain their shares in the ESOP.
Third, the ESOP has a limited  life-span  and  rules  concerning  eligibility  to  participate  have
implications for trade union influence.  The Eircom ESOP has a maximum  life-span  of  20  years
and can only make tax-free distributions to many of its participants until 2013.  Indeed, the  ESOP
is likely to be wound up before this date is  reached.   As  membership  is  confined  to  those  who
joined the  firm  prior  to  2002  new  employees  are  excluded  from  ESOP  membership.   These
features of the ESOP tend to limit the possibility of the ESOP enhancing the employee  voice  role
of the trade unions.
Overall,  these  findings  raise  questions  about  the  effectiveness  of  the   ESOP   to   enhance
employee  voice  in  Eircom.   Although  there  was  a  sizable   exchange   of   shares   and   board
representation in return for employee co-operation with privatization, there is  no  clear  indication
that the position of trade unions has been strengthened in terms  of  protecting  employee  welfare.
Moreover the ESOP has played a key role  in  approving  a  number  of  controversial  changes  of
ownership at Eircom.  Since privatization in 1999 the company has undergone three takeovers and
these changes  have  been  associated  with  deteriorations  in  company  performance  and  service
quality (Palcic and Reeves, 2005).  As these changes have arguably not been in the public  interest
the role of the ESOP has been widely  criticized  for  not  acting  in  accordance  with  trade  union
principles (Sweeney, 2004).  These events as well as the factors outlined above shed  light  on  our
finding that from an employee perspective privatization and the ESOP is associated with enhanced
managerial bargaining strength and a corresponding reduction in the bargaining  strength  of  trade
unions.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The authors are grateful to the Irish Research Council for the Humanities and Social  Sciences  for
providing funding for this research.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Arrowsmith, J. (2003) Post-Privatisation Industrial Relations in the UK Rail and Electricity
Industries. Industrial Relations Journal, 34: 2 pp150-164.
D’Art, D. and Turner, T. (2004) The Experience of Union Officials with Recognition and
Partnership at work in the Irish Private Sector. Working Paper Research Series: Paper No. 02/04.
Department of Personnel and Employment Relations, University of Limerick.
 
 D’Art, D. Turner, T. (2008) ‘Is There a Potential ‘Representation Gap’ in the New Irish
Economy?’ in Hastings, T. (ed)  The State of the Unions. Dublin: Liffey Press.
Earle, J. S., Estrin, S. and Leshchenko, L. (1996) ’Ownership Structures, Patterns of Control and
Enterprise Behaviour in Russia’ in S. Commander, Q. Fen and M. Schatter (eds.) Enterprise
Restructuring and Economic Policy in Russia. Washington: The World Bank,
Ferner, A. (1998) Government, Managers and Industrial Relations: Public Enterprises and their
Political Environment, Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd.
Ferner, A. and Colling, T. (1991) Privatization, Regulation and Industrial Relations. British
Journal of Industrial Relations, 29: 3 pp391-410.
Ferner, A. and Colling, T. (1993) ’Privatization of the British Utilities: Regulation,
Decentralization and Industrial Relations’ in T. Clarke and C. Pitelis (eds.) The Political Economy
of Privatization. London: Routledge, pp125-141.
Hastings, T. (2002) Interview with Cathal Magee: How to Implement Change. The Journal of the
Labour Relations Commission, 1: 1 pp9-11.
Hastings, T. (2003a) Making the Quantum Leap with an ESOP: Interview with Shay Cody.
Labour Relations Commission Review, 1: 2 pp5-7.
Hastings, T. (2003b) Politics, Management and Industrial Relations: Semi-State Companies and
the Challenges of Marketization, Dublin: Blackhall Publishing.
McCarthy, D., Reeves, E. and Turner, T. (2010) Can Employee Share-Ownership Improve
Employee Attitudes and Behaviour? Employee Relations Journal, 32: 4.
O’Connell Davidson, J. (1993) Privatization & Employment Relations: The Case of the Water
Industry, London: Mansell Publishing Limited.
Palcic, D. and Reeves, E. (2005) An Economic Analysis of Privatisation in Ireland, 1991-2003.
Journal of the Statistical and Social Inquiry Society of Ireland, 34: 2004/2005 pp1-27.
Pendleton, A. (1994) Structural Organization and Labour Management in Public Enterprise: A
Study of British Rail. Journal of Management Studies, 31: 1 pp33-54.
Pendleton, A. (1999) Ownership or Competition?  An Evaluation of the Effects of Privatization on
Industrial Relations Institutions, Processes and Outcomes. Public Administration, 77: 4 pp769-
792.
Poole, M. and Jenkins, G. (1990) The Impact of Economic Democracy: Profit-sharing and
Employee-Shareholding Schemes, London: Routledge.
Sheehan, B. (2007) Eircom Agrees to Pay Rise Under Partnership Agreement in Wake of Dispute,
Dublin: IRN Publishing.
Sweeney, P. (2004) Selling Out? Privatisation in Ireland, Dublin: New Island.
Telecom-Éireann (1997a) Report & Accounts for the Year Ended 3 April 1997, Dublin: Bord
Telecom Éireann.
Telecom-Éireann (1997b) The Telecom Partnership: A Framework Agreement for the
Transformation of Telecom Éireann into a World Class Telecommunications Business, Dublin:
Bord Telecom Éireann.
Appendix 1
Descriptive statistics and correlation between variables
Variables |M* |SD |? |1 |2 |3 |4 |5 |6 |7 |8 |9 |10 |11 | |1 Gender |- |- |- | | | | | | | | | | | | |2 Tenure |26.4 |10.2 |-
|.36 | | | | | | | | | | | |3 Union |- |- |- |.14 |.59 | | | | | | | | | | |4 Retail |- |- |- |-.26 |-.38 |-.26 | | | | | | | | | |5 Other |- |- |- |-
.14 |-.04 |-.06 |-.19 | | | | | | | | |6 ESOP |- |- |- |.11 |.63 |.65 |-.28 |-.03 | | | | | | | |7 Collab |2.8 |1.0 |.71 |-.04 |-.15 |-
.02 |.04 |.05 |-.05 | | | | | | |8OpPart |4.9 |1.3 |.85 |.05 |.07 |.06 |-.03 |-.02 |.10 |.10 | | | | | |9 StratPart |5.3 |1.4 |.90
|.07 |.12 |.11 |-.04 |-.03 |.08 |.01 |.65 | | | | |10 Cond |4.6 |0.9 |.75 |.01 |.07 |.09 |-.01 |.01 |.06 |.15 |.45 |.31 | |
| |11 MgtBar |2.5 |1.4 |.77 |-.09 |-.12 |-.08 |.08 |.08 |-.09 |.28 |-.23 |-.28 |-.18 | | |12 TUBar |4.8 |1.7 |.85 |.20
|.16 |.10 |-.08 |-.07 |.09 |.06 |.42 |.41 |.41 |-.46 | |Note: N = 711, If r ?.08, p < .05; r ? .12, p < .01; r ? .14, p < .001,
*mean values, with the exception of  tenure,  are  based  on  each  measure’s  original  seven-point
scale
-------------------------------------------
[1] Comsource was a consortium of the privatized Dutch telecom KPN and the Swedish
state?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?"??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-
owned telecom Telia
[2] Employees were asked to rate the bargaining strength of management and trade unions on a
scale of 1(very strong) to 7 (very weak).  A response of 1 to 3 was considered ‘a strong bargaining
position’, while a response of 5 to 7 was considered ‘a weak bargaining position’.
------------------------------------
ESOP
•ownership rights
•board representation
Privatization
•reduced political intervention
•shareholder control
•market competition
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•conditions of employment
•mgt.-union collaboration
•employee participation
